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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
A PROMISE TO PERFORM A BROKEN CONTRACT AS
A CONSIDERATION FOR A PROMISE TO PAY
ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION.
The cases on this subject indicate that there is a distinct
conflict among the various states as to the legal validity of the
subsequent promise. The general rule seems to be that the
promise to pay one already under a contractual obligation to
perform, additional compensation to make him perform is
void, and without consideration.
The courts seem to base this rule upon the principle that
the one who is to receive the additional compensation in the
second agreement obtains no legal benefit for he is already
under an obligation to perform, while the one promising the
additional compensation to the other who has broken or has
threatened to break his contract receives nothing more in re-
turn for the additional compensation than he should have re-
ceived under the prevailing contract.
This rule, however, has been subject to many exceptions
in the different states. Some courts have upheld the prom-
ise of additional compensation on the ground that the parties
waived their mutual rights under the old contract, and this
waiver constitutes a sufficient consideration for the new pro-
vision.' Another court has found that in a case where the
promisor has elected to pay the additional compensation
rather than sue under the existing contract, that this election
1. 33 Ala. 265.
14 Jahns.331
10 Ind. 282.
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constituted sufficient grounds on which to enforce the con-
tract.2 Other courts have enforced the subsequent agreement
when they found that the parties had rescinded the original
agreement and had entered into a new agreement.- In two
other states4 the courts have enforced the subsequent agree-
ment when they found that after the performance of the orig-
inal contract was begun the contractor encountered unfor-
seen difficultibs which were not within the contemplation of
the parties at the time of executing the original agreement and
which would make necessary additional expenditure on the
part of the contractor. Courts in most have upheld the sub-
sequent agreement if they were able to find any definite
change in the subject matter.
Recently, this question has arisen in New York in Mc-
Gowan & Connoly Co., Inc., v. Kenny-Moran Co., Inc., et al.,5
where the court held, "A promise to pay a sum in addition to
the contract price, when the contractor threatened to break his
contract because labor and material costs had increased, was
without consideration, because the contractor only promised to
perform that which it was already its duty to do under the
contract." In the decision, the court not only seems to have
followed the general rule, but expressly states in the opinion
that the exceptions do not apply. The court there says, "The
agreement to pay the $1000 was without consideration, as the
plaintiff only agreed to do what it was already bound to do
under the existing contract. There was no rescission, no new
2. 139 Mass. 440.
3. 172 N. Y. Supp. 688.
152 Mo. App. 221.
4. Minnesota and Maryland.
5. 202 N. Y. S. 513.
207 App. Div. 617.
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contract, and no consideration for the agreement to pay the
additional $1000." The McGowan case seems to be an appli-
cation of the rule generally applied in New York toward
promises of additional compensation in order to make a con-
tractor complete his contract, but there are cases where the
subsequent promise has been recognized and enforced. How-
ever, the decisions which uphold the promise of additional
compensation are to be found in cases where the court found
that there was a rescission of the old contract and the forma-
tion of a new agreement, as in the case of Schwartzreich v.
Bauman-Basch.6 In the McGowan case, the court decided that
there was no rescission of the old contract and the substitu-
tion of a new one, but merely a promise to pay additional
compensation to make a contractor perform a pre-existing
legal obligation.
In the opinion in Schwartzreich 'v. Bauman-Basch, where
the court found that the promise of additional compensation
could be enforced, the judge refers to the rule that a promise
made to induce a party to do that which he is already bound
by contract to do is without consideration and nudum pactum,
but decides that as there was a rescission of the old contract
and the formation of a new contract indicated by the facts,
the rule did not apply, and the new contract was valid.
The earlier New York cases indicate the same general
application of the rule and the exception. Galway v. Prig-
nano7 recognized "the promise of additional compensation as
invalid unless there is a substitution of a new contract." The
cases which have upheld the validity of the promise of addi..
6. 172 N. Y. Supp. 683. (1918.)
7. 134 N. Y. Supp. 571.
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tional compensation follow Lattimore v. Harsen8 in which the
court found that the facts indicated that the old contract was
rescinded and a new agreement entered into. The new agree-
ment is also recognized as enforceable in Hart v. Lauman,9
where the facts indicated that the old contract had been abro-
gated by the new provision.
In Vanderbilt v. Schreyer'° the court said, "It would
doubtless be competent for the parties to cancel the existing
contract and make a new one to complete the same work at
a different rate of compensation, but it seems that there
should be a valid cancellation of the original contract." The
court did not find a cancellation of the existing contract. A
majority of New York decisions, however, indicate that the
promise of additional compensation is unenforceable.
The Massachusetts courts have adopted a more liberal
attitude toward the finding of grounds upon wihch to sustain
and enforce the promise of additional compensation than
found in the decisions of the New York courts. In Munroe v.
Pcrkbs,11 a leading Massachusetts case on the subject, the
court decided that as the plaintiff had refused to perform his
contract, made himself liable in a suit for damages, and after
the promise of additional reward had performed the contract
in good faith relying on the promise of additional reward, the
completion of the contract relying on the promise of addi-
tional reward, the vaiver on the part of the defendant of his
right to sue for the breach of the contract, and the difficutly
which the plaintiff had in completing the contract formed suf-
8. 14 John. 330.
9. 29 Garb. 410.
10. '1 N. Y. 392.
11. 9 Pick. 298.
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fieient consideration on which to enforce the promise of addi.
tional compensation. Hastings v. Lovejoy 12 follows Munroe
v. Perkins and cites it as the authority for enforcing the
contract.
In Rollins v. Marsh,13 the court said that the new con-
tract with the promise of the additional compensation rescind-
ed the old contract, that the release of one party by the
other was consideration for the release on the other side, and
the mutual releases were a consideration for the new contract.
In another Massachusetts case the court decided that fhe
promisor could have elected either to sue for damages or pay
more, and the plaintiff acting on the promise completed the
contract, the contract was enforceable. In that case, the court
decided that the performance of the old obligation was a suf-
contract prima facie takes the place of the old one.
ficient consideration for the new promise, and that the new
In recent case of rarrot v. Mexican Central Ry. Co.,14
the Massachusetts court did not enforce the promise of addi-
tional compensation, but the court did not deny the rule gen-
erally recognized in previous cases in Massachusetts, but dis-
tinguished the facts of the case at hand from the facts in the
cases where the promise was enforced, and said that the
Massachusetts rule in Munroe v. Perkins5 could not be applied
to the case in question. In general, the Massachusetts courts
have sustained the validity of the promise of additional com-
pensation when they could find that the facts indicated a
12. 140 Mass. 261.
33. 128 Mass. 116.
14. Rogers v. Rogers, 139 Mass. 140.
15. 207 Mass. 184.
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waiver of the right to sue, satisfaction of a claim for dam-
ages, abrogation of the old agreement and the formation of
a new contract.
Minnesota and Maryland have enforced the new provision
for additional compensation, but have denied the principle
upon which the Massachusetts courts have upheld the new
provision and have a different principle upon which to enforce
the execution of the new provision. The Minnesota court has
enforced the provision for additional compensation in cases
where it found that after the contractor began to perform his
contract, he encountered unforseen difficulties which were
not reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the formation of the original agreement and which
would make necessary additional expenditure on the part of
the contractor if he was to complete his contract. As to
what constitutes such unforseen difficulties, the judge in
King v. Duluth M. & N. Ry. Co.,16 said, "What unforseen dif-
ficulties and burdens will make a party's refusal to go for-
ward with his contract equitable so as to take the case out of
the general rule and bring it within the exception, must depend
upon the facts of each particular, case. They must be sub-
stantial, unforseen, and not within the contemplation of the
parties at the time the contract was formed. * * * Inadequacy
of the contract price which is a result of an error of judg-
ment and not some excusable mistake of fact, is not suffi-
cient. "
The last statement indicates that the promise of additional
compensation in the recent McGowan case, supra, in New
York would not have been sustained even under the Minnesota
16. 61 Minn. 487.
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exception, because the unforseen difficulty in the McGowan
case was an unforseen rise in material costs, a fact which is
not an unforseen difficulty in the fight of the Minnesota
exception.
The Minnesota exception has also been followed in Mary-
land. In Linz v. Shuck,17 a contractor agreed to excavate
for a cellar, and after he had penetrated beneath the surface
of the earth he encountered an unforseen bed of swampy mud
which made it necessary for the contractor to obtain compen-
sation in addition to the contract price in order to perform his
contract without loss. The court enforced the owner's prom-
ise of additional compensation and recognized the unforseen
difficulty coupled with the completion of the contract in reli-
ance on the promise of additional compensation as a valid
consideration.
There are decisions in other jurisdictions which indicate
the application of a principle somewhat analogous to the un-
forseen difficulty exception applied in Minnesota and Mary-
land. In one case, mutual mistake as to the character of the
soil when the parties were forming the original agreement
was held to be sufficient consideration to uphold the promise
of additional compensation made after the mistake was dis-
covered. In another case the promise was sustained when
the contractor had encountered solid rock which was not.
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the agree-
ment was formed.
17. 106 Md. 220.
67 AtI. 286.
11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 789.
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The ruling in New York in the McGowan case is much
similar to the rule generally applied in Missouri on the same
subject. In Smith v. Sickenger,18 Judge Ellison said, "Now,
it is a well-recognized law that, when one promises another
additional or different compensation if he will do what he is
already obligated to the promisor to do, the promise is with-
out consideration and unenforceable." This decision follows
the rule in Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co.,19 where
the court held that the promise of additional compensation
made to an architect after he had refused to perform his con-
tract in order to make him complete the contract was unen-
forceable. This ruling seems to have been upheld in a ma-
jority of the cases on this subject in Missouri, although there
seems to have been an exception to the rule applied when the
court found that there was a valid abrogation of the old con-
tract and the formation of a new contract.
In Lindsay and Son v. Kansas City V. & T. Co.2 0 the
court found that the facts were such as to bring the case
within the exception and enforced the promise of additional
compensation as an independent contract with a new consid-
eration. In the opinion the judge recognized the general rule.
but decided that it did not apply as the facts indicated that
the provision for the additional compensation was an inde-
pendent contract with a new consideration i. e. the agreement
of the new promisor to pay an increased consideration. On
the other hand in the Lingenfelder case, supra, the court
found the subsequent promise to be based on neither a com-
promise of a doubtful claim, nor the abrogation of the old
18. 202 S. W. 263 (1918.)
19. 103 Mo. 578.
20. 152 Mo. App. 221.
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contract with the formation of a new one, but merely a prom-
ise without consideration and a nudum pacturn.
In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Domenico,1 the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals held, that the promise to pay a fish-
erman a larger salary than he was entitled to under the hiring
contract because he threatened to desert the shipowner after
the season had commenced and men were scarce, was void
and not enforceable. The court said that it would be a trav-
ersity of justice to allow the man to recover on the promise
which he had practically extorted from the promisor. This
decision is much similar to the decisions of the English courts
which held that a promise to pay a seaman higher wages in
order to make him perform his labors was not enforceable
because the seaman was already under a contractual obliga-
tion to perform those duties. However, even in England
where the general rule seems to have been applied strictly, in
Scotson V. Pegg,22 Baron Martin said, "If a builder was under
a contract to finish a house on a particular day, and the
owner promises him a sum of money if he would do it, what is
to prevent the builder from recovering the moneyV'
In two recent cases, the Federal Courts have seen fit to
hold a promise of additional compensation as enforceable, but
the facts have not been analagous to the Alaska Packers case.
In United Svates v. Casey,23 the court decided that when a
contractor had been delayed by the fault of the owner him-
self and the delay was such as to prevent the completion of
21. 117 Fed. 99.
54 0. C. A. 485 (1902).
22. 6 H. & N. 295.
23. 262 Fed. 889. (1920.)
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the work during good weather and make necessaty -the com-
pletion of the work during the winter season, the provision
for additional compensation was enforceable. The waiver
of damages for the delays oc~asioned by the owner and the
completion of the contract during the bad weather were suf-
ficient consideration for the promise of additional compen-
sation.
In the United States v. Cook, 4 the Supreme Court found
that the promise of additional compensation made because
the contractbr had been delayed in the completion of the con-
tract by the San Francisco earthquake and fire was valid And
enforceable. The court said in the opinion that there was a
moral consideration which properly induced the recognition
of an honorable obligation and turned an unenforceable equity
into a binding and effective provision.
The decisions of the court seem, in the maii, to indicate
that as far as possible the judges have applied either the
general rule denying the validity of the subsequent promise; or
one of the exceptions enf6rcing payment of the additional
compensation according to the equities of the particular case.
The cases manifest a tendency to apply the rule strictly
where the facts indicate that the promise of additional com-
pensation was practically extorted from the promisor, but
indicate that exceptions have been made where the facts of
the case tended to show that the promise of additional com-
pensation was voluntary and was prompted by a recognition
of the hardship involved in the performance of the original
agreement without extra compensation.
.4. 257 U. S. 523 (1922.)
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As one judge has said, it would be a traversity of justice
to enforce payment of the additional compensation when the
promise was practically coerced from the promisor by a
laborer who had an unjustifiable advantage.
There are cases which indicate that it is just and equi-
table to apply an exception and enforce the payment of the
extra compensation. Where for example, a contract to ex-
cavate having been entered into in good faith, the contractor
encountered a type of soil different from that anticipated at
the time of the formation of the original agreement, it would
seem just to enforce a promise of additional compensation
made in recognition of the difficulty, particularly if acted
upon by completing the excavating.
The ease with which the judges apply the exceptions,
however, seems to depend upon the state in which the court
is located. In New York and the States which follow the
New York rule, it is harder to obtain the application of an
exception, as the evidence must show that there was an inten-
tion to abrogate the old agreement and form a new agree-
ment. In Massachusetts, Minnesota, Maryland, Michigan and
Washington it is easier to find an exception to the general
rule upon which the promise of additional compensation will
be sustained.
MAuxicE L. STEWART, '27.
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